International Relations Review

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How a Blockade Led to Ethnic Cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh

While the full scale war in Ukraine continues, another conflict in the Post-Soviet space reignited with unmitigated brutality. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, known as Artsakh to Armenians, dates back to 1923. Joseph Stalin, then the Soviet Commissar of Nationalities, placed the region into the borders of Soviet Azerbaijan, despite an overwhelming ethnic Armenian majority. In 1988, a movement began among Karabakhi Armenians to secede from Azerbaijan. What followed was a war that lasted until a ceasefire was brokered in 1994. The first war saw the local Karabakhi Armenians, with support from Armenia, establish control over Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts. Azerbaijan vowed to retake the territory and never recognize the independence of the local Armenians.  In the following years the ceasefire was violated regularly with little progress made in negotiations due to hardline positions taken by the sides. In 2020, Azerbaijan began a new war which ultimately saw their forces take control of the seven districts and a part of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. 

In a new ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia, the part of Nagorno-Karabakh that was not occupied by Azerbaijan was to be protected by a Russian peacekeeping force. This peacekeeping force would also ensure safe and unimpeded transportation along the Lachin Corridor—the sole remaining road between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, in December 2022, Azerbaijani “activists,” acting on behalf of the Government of Azerbaijan, closed the Lachin Corridor over “environmental concerns” related to ore mining in Nagorno-Karabakh, only allowing vehicles from the Red Cross and the Russian peacekeeping contingent through. While Armenian officials from Nagorno-Karabakh halted ore mining to address any potential concerns, the road closure continued with the Russian peacekeeping contingent, in charge of the safety of the Lachin Corridor, refusing to intervene. 

In April 2023, Azerbaijan installed an official checkpoint at the beginning of the Lachin Corridor on the border with Armenia and  refused to allow any commercial traffic into Nagorno-Karabakh, including humanitarian assistance, through the corridor. There were cases of ethnic Karababkhi Armenians being detained for alleged “war crimes” at the checkpoint though there was little evidence to back up the accusations. Azerbaijan also damaged electricity, internet, and gas infrastructure along the corridor and prevented their repair, further worsening the humanitarian crisis in the region.

The blockade led to immense food, fuel, and medicine shortages. There were reported deaths from malnutrition and increased rates of miscarriages amongst pregnant women who did not have access to sufficient food or medical care. Karabakhi Armenians had to stand in line for hours, often late into the night to receive small portions of bread. In August, a former prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo, released a report, warning that the Azerbaijani government is activley mounting a genocide against the 120,000 Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh and using starvation as a weapon. Other analysts pointed out that the blockade could have been an attempt by Azerbaijan to coerce Armenia into providing a corridor to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan, which would have no Armenian customs or passport checkpoints. The humanitarian crisis also led to the resignation of senior political figures in Nagorno-Karabakh including the Speaker of the National Assembly and the President of Nagorno-Karabakh. The president cited an "unstable geopolitical situation" and "Artsakh's internal political and social environment" as factors in influencing his decision. 

Despite Russia’s commitments to maintain freedom of movement along the Lachin corridor, it failed to reopen the road to allow for unimpeded civilian traffic. Aside from facilitating isolated cases of medical evacuations to Armenia and bringing in a single truck of humanitarian aid through Azerbaijan, Russia took no active efforts on the ground to return corridor access. Some reporters and analysts explained Russia’s inaction as their preoccupation with the war in Ukraine and an inability to become engaged in another conflict. Others however, have pointed out that Russia has strategic interests in Azerbaijan, including the ability to re-export Russian gas to the EU under the guise of it being Azerbaijani gas. There were also numerous violations of the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh before the invasion of Ukraine, giving credence to the theory that Russia’s inaction isn’t solely based on other priorities. As such, Russia’s interests were at stake in potentially engaging in an open conflict with Azerbaijan. Russian inaction in Nagorno-Karabakh also significantly strained Russian-Armenian relations, with Armenia often publicly questioning the efficacy of the Russian peacekeeping force. As a result, Armenia also began to expand its defense-related cooperation with other countries, such as India and the U.S., which is seen by many to be a snub to Russia and an effort by Armenia to develop new partnerships away from Russia. 

In tandem with the blockade, multiple videos emerged online showing the movement of Azerbaijani soldiers, reservists, and equipment to the borders of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The videos also show battle markings such as an upside down A painted on Azerbaijani military vehicles, similar in nature to Russia’s infamous Z symbol. These movements sparked fear that a new full scale conflict may be on the horizon in Nagorno-Karabakh.

These fears were realized on September 19, when Azerbaijan launched an offensive into Nagorno-Karabakh using drones, tanks, artillery, missiles, and special forces. The Russian peacekeeping contingent once again refused to intervene, despite taking casualties of their own. The Government of Armenia also announced that they would not come to the aid of the Karabakh Armenians out of fear that internationally recognized Armenian territory would be attacked. Within 24 hours, the local Armenian defense forces surrendered after key roads and villages had been captured and agreed to hand over their weapons to Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians have said over 200 Karabakhi Armenians have been killed in the recent clashes, including civilians, with 400 wounded. That number is expected to rise as there have reportedly been problems establishing communication with certain parts of the territory. Azerbaijan has also suffered around 200 military casualties. There have been ​​emerging reports of numerous war crimes during the 24 hour offensive such as the murder of civilians (including children), beheadings, kidnapping, and the targeting of civilian areas and infrastructure. 

While Azerbaijani officials have claimed that local Armenians will be able to stay, few Karabakhi Armenians trust these statements given the long history of displacement, violence against Armenian civilians, and strong Armenephobia in Azerbaijani society. Many feel that if they were to stay, they would be putting their lives at risk. As a result, virtually all of the 120,000 Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh have left their homes and are trying to escape to Armenia. Many, including Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, believe that this exodus constitutes an ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. Daily, thousands of refugees have entered Armenia with little more than the clothes on their backs and a few personal possessions. 

Meanwhile, unrest has been growing in Armenia. There have been some groups which have directed their anger towards Russia, including protesting in front of the Russian Embassy in Yerevan with chants of “Russia the enemy.” The anger against Russia also seems to be shared by the Armenian government, with Pashinyan once again speaking out against the “insufficient” relationship between Russia and Armenia. Some have even suspected that Armenia could take steps to leave Russian led organizations like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). There is also great anger against the Armenian Government, with some Armenian citizens claiming that the government failed to take necessary steps to protect Karabakhi Armenians. Protests have broken out in front of government buildings resulting in road closures by protesters with some subsequently arrested. While some of the anger is certainly genuine, certain analysts have claimed that Russia and pro-Russian parties in Armenia are trying to use the protests as a means to topple the increasingly pro-Western and democratic government. 

Armenia is facing numerous challenges in the coming months and years. It will have to properly accommodate the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh and deal with internal political tensions. Armenia may also take steps to realign itself geopolitically as many no longer see Russia as a reliable security partner. It must also continue efforts to strengthen diplomatically and militarily to prevent future attacks on internationally recognized Armenian territory.