Despite possessing the most robust democratic political system in the Gulf, Kuwait has struggled through decades of severe political stagnation yet has also frequently displayed liberal characteristics like intense Parliament-level debates surrounding divisive topics like economic diversification, corruption, or the government’s inability to attract adequate foreign investment. Kuwait’s political system is fractured among its popularly elected Parliament, the royally appointed cabinet, and the Emir. Kuwait’s Parliament is one of the most powerful elected bodies in the Gulf, a region that largely tends to lean authoritarian. Neighboring countries Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates all operate under monarchical systems and largely lack arenas for meaningful political participation. Meanwhile, Kuwait holds elections–that are generally free and fair– to allot seats in its unicameral, fifty-person National Assembly, which has the power to check the hereditary al-Sabah royal family. However, the political system has been hindered by frequent patronage and an aversion to coalition-building; Kuwait’s Parliament is currently dominated by the opposition, further enhancing its political gridlock. These issues came to a head in May 2024 when Kuwait’s Emir, Sheikh Mishaal al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, indefinitely suspended the Kuwaiti Parliament for the first time since 1986, and suspended other parts of the constitution for up to four years, a move many experts see as a sign of democratic backsliding in Kuwait. This move has effectively placed Kuwait in a holding pattern: its decades-old broken political system has left Kuwaitis disgruntled, yet the Emir’s decree offered no clear way out of the entrenched political gridlock. 

A constitutional monarchy currently governs Kuwait, with a ruling Emir at the top of the political system, who has the final say on most financial and judicial matters. The Em ir has extensive influence in the economic and judicial domain of the country, has the power to appoint the Prime Minister, and always descends from the royal al-Sabah family. Other royal princes use the political capital that comes with being from the royal family to secure their own position in state ministries, ensuring that the al-Sabah royal family does not slip from power. While these characteristics are similar to those of other Gulf governments, Kuwait significantly differs from its neighbors vis-à-vis its Parliament. Unlike in neighboring countries, Kuwaitis and Parliamentarians are permitted to express their disdain for the royal family overtly through public protests, no-confidence votes, and interpellation, all of which are largely impossible in other Gulf states. Frequent and lively civil discourse in Kuwait has led to a gradual reduction in media censorship and a decrease in excessive repression by the royal family. Thus, the Emir’s recent move to suspend Parliament has moved the country in the opposite direction and is a concern to proponents of democracy worldwide, as the National Assembly has long been the flagship institution of liberal politics in Kuwait. 

Along with the indefinite suspension of Parliament, the Emir called for the creation of a committee to draft possible constitutional amendments that would aim to end political deadlock and enact meaningful change in Kuwait. How exactly these amendments would end political deadlock is still unclear. If realized, these amendments would then be submitted to a public referendum or Parliament if a new Parliament has been elected by then. While some have expressed concern over this growing authoritarianism, the Emir’s actions simultaneously reflect a common frustration with Kuwaitis that their government is ineffectual and incessantly held up by a poorly structured system. After the initial announcement from the Emir, there was no public outrage from the Kuwaitis themselves, nor was there much public reaction from regional countries. The only expressed support for the Kuwaiti Emir came from the Emirati president, who affirmed his commitment to regional stability. The relative silence from Kuwait’s other authoritarian neighbors could be due partly to their satisfaction in seeing al-Sabah limit popular power in Kuwait, as it undermines the rule of the people and legitimizes hereditary despotism. 

The Kuwaiti political system faced similar crises in 1976 and 1986, both of which ended in unamended constitutions and no major government restructuring. The current political crisis is not fundamentally different from those and is unlikely to lead to a stronger democratic process. In all three situations, the ruling Emir has sought to change the longstanding norm of political stagnation by suspending Parliament with the nominal goal of strengthening liberal democracy while upholding Sharia law. The committee set to propose constitutional amendments is to be appointed by the Emir and has a very vague mandate; the amendments are supposed to improve the political system while being in accordance with Kuwaiti traditions. However, with parts of the constitution now suspended, it is unclear how Parliament will be re-elected, and, with an appointed committee under the eye of the Emir drafting changes to the constitution, it is unlikely that these recent moves will create a more efficient democratic process in Kuwait. Ultimately, the Emir’s move was an attempt to provide Kuwait a way out of its faltering political system which has been waging a monumental battle for sound and functioning democracy in the Middle East. As Kuwait’s part-liberal and part-monarchical governance structure continues to create a perennial deadlock, faith in the system amongst Kuwaitis will decline. The Emir, along with the opposition, must collaborate to forge a path out of this gridlock and to a more democratic future.