Five words—“The political crisis is not over”—contextualize the state of affairs in the Republic of Bulgaria. These words were spoken by President Rumen Radev ahead of the swearing-in ceremony in late August to re-confirm Dimitar Glavchev as the Caretaker–interim Prime Minister–of the Bulgarian Government since he initially was sworn in April earlier this year.

Along with this phrase, Radev announced that Bulgaria will conduct snap elections–elections called earlier than what is mandated–on October 27 in order to achieve a ‘sustainable majority in parliament.’ This will be the second snap parliamentary election in Bulgaria this year. The first occurred in June due to a failed governmental leadership rotation that was agreed upon in May of last year, and coincided with elections for European Parliament representatives. Furthermore, Bulgaria has held six parliamentary elections in the last three years, making October’s election the seventh one since 2021. This year will not even be a record high for elections for the southeastern European nation, seeing as 2021 saw Bulgarians head to the polls three separate times, two of which were only two months apart.

June’s election yielded only 33% voter turnout, with relatively high support for extremist parties both from the left and right. For example, Bulgaria’s Socialist Party (BSP), a successor to its Communist-era ruling party, along with its far-right counterparts Velichie (Greatness) and  ‘Vazrazhdane’ (Revival) party, the latter of which has been accused of incorporating Nazi imagery in demonstrations, together won 71 seats in June’s election. Although they were greatly outnumbered by centrist EU-friendly parties such as GERB-SDS (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria - Union of Democratic Forces), DPS (Movement for Rights and Freedoms), and the PP-DB (We Continue the Change - Democratic Bulgaria) coalition, Russophilic parties nonetheless present a substantial hurdle to creating a clear majority government in the Narodno Sabranie–Bulgaria’s parliament. Although Pro-EU (European Union) parties have agreed to numerous coalitions and power-sharing mandates, fragmentation and political agreements that have failed to materialize have allowed President Radev to define Bulgaria’s foreign policy outlook.

Throughout these politically tumultuous past three years in Bulgaria, Radev’s position within Sofia has remained static since his first election in 2016, his presidential ascension in 2017, and his re-election in 2021. While Bulgaria remains an active member of both the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Radev has diverged from his fellow politicians in their criticisms of the Kremlin, displaying signs that extend beyond professionalism to Russia since the beginning of his term. In addition to being critical of European economic sanctions on Russia and joint NATO related commitments, Radev has made more blatant pro-Russia gestures that have drawn attention worldwide.

Radev has maintained the outward appearance of being nominally cooperative with European bodies. However, Radev has repeated propagandistic rhetoric emanating from Russian disinformation sources, much to the benefit of the Russian war image of itself as the reactionary party. Days after skipping NATO’s annual summit, held in July 2023 in Vilnius, Lithuania, Radev attended the opening of the quadrennial National Folklore Festival in Bulgaria’s mountainous Rhodopes region. Speaking to journalists at the festival, Radev asserted that “Ukraine insists on waging this war,” adding that “it should also be clear that the bill is paid by the whole of Europe.” This statement/belief was in stark contrast to the views of Bulgarian Prime Minister (PM) Nikolai Denkov (2023-2024), who quickly countered Radev’s claim to address the immediate criticism from Kyiv, laying the blame solely on the “circle around Putin.” Additionally, Denkov said the following on the matter of the Russian invasion: “I say again: the quickest way to stop this war is for this same circle to call on their troops to get out.”

Whether it is declaring a Ukrainian victory “impossible,” skipping NATO summits, or attending banned pro-Russian Soviet veteran marches in Sofia, Radev’s past statements and actions have convoluted any parliamentary attempt to express solidarity and support for Ukraine. Bulgaria’s government at times has presented itself as integral to Ukraine’s defense, with then PM Kiril Petkov (2021 - 2022) commending Bulgaria for providing a third of Ukraine’s needed ammunition supply in the early stages of Russia’s invasion. As Radev has become more vocal in his objections to continuing Bulgaria’s staunch military support–due to the belief it merely prolongs the Russo-Ukrainian War–the idea of negotiations or cessation of Ukrainian territory as a peace effort has been proposed by Putin as a means for ending the war. These doubts of a clear victor, whether intentionally or not, have all been integral in advancing the strategy of the Kremlin in its effort to justify its actions as the victim of NATO and Western encroachment–a narrative that Radev has contributed to.

While it may seem as though Russia would desire approval from outside parties, the ‘neutral’ perspective of Radev may in fact be beneficial to Moscow’s media campaign. Since the endorsement of Russia’s invasion by a EU nation–such as Bulgaria–would inevitably come with allegations of Russophilia and an anti-West stance, the increasingly ‘neutral’ position Bulgaria has taken temporarily mitigates this issue. In polls conducted in 2023 and 2024, a majority of Bulgarians still favored supporting Ukraine, although there was a 2.3 percent increase in respondents who held the opinion that a Western provocation of Russia began the war. Now, with a parliament in disarray, paired with interparty factioning and polls indicating yet another election–due to frequent disagreements in government–that would produce no majority in parliament this October, there lies an abundance of indicators of an impasse in Sofia.

Coming up on three years since the invasion, initial unwavering support for Ukraine has been weathered not only in Bulgaria, but across Europe and among other traditionally strong allies. An end to the Russian invasion continues to be out of reach, causing devastation within Ukraine and downward economic performance in trade on both sides. Additionally, President Radev is not the only head of state who has voiced a call to neutrality. Other leaders of former Eastern Bloc nations have also expressed objection to stern economic repercussions for Russia. PM Viktor Orbán of Hungary, who has delayed EU membership discussions for Ukraine, visited both Moscow and Beijing this year to broker negotiations with Putin on behalf of the EU, drawing the immediate criticism of the European Council’s President Charles Michel. In a splintering of European nations, between those agreeing with Orbán’s growing Euroscepticism and those staunchly pro-European, other nearby leaders have seen Orbán and his Hungary as an ideal diplomatic model. Robert Fico of Slovakia, now in his third term as the nation’s PM, stated that he favorably envisions that Slovakia could become like a ‘Second Hungary,’ echoing objections to sanctions on Russia and pushing for leniency on punitive measures. 

Even outside of Eastern Europe, France’s National Rally (RN) has been accused of utilizing pro-Russian rhetoric and allegedly received funds from Russian banks during the invasion of Crimea in 2014. Marine Le Pen, who succeeded her father as leader of the RN had described Putin in 2014 as a “like-minded politician,” asserting that Crimea was an integral part of Russia, deeming its annexation as legal. Such rhetoric making the case of legitimacy of the 2014 annexation mirrors that of the language which originates from the offices of the Kremlin.

‘Putinversteher’, coined by German outlet Der Spiegel, is used to describe those who  empathize with Putin’s national objective in his “special military operation.” With Putinversteher on the increase in Bulgaria and surrounding nations, a domestic election no longer remains a purely domestic matter.