China and Russia are more aligned now than when they both experienced their communist awakenings. As they seek to expand their global influence, they are simultaneously eroding well-established security norms and increasing the risk of global conflict. Their relationship is likely to continue strengthening as some of their independent interests and threat perceptions coincide, especially concerning perceived the United States unilateralism and interventionism, and Western promotion of human rights and democratic values.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine will certainly impact Asian leaders’ strategic thinking about the U.S. credibility and commitment to Asia, and the U.S. entering a conflict in Europe has Asian leaders concerned over whether the United States can maintain focus on Asia. A weak U.S. response to Russia could signal to Asian leaders that the United States is hesitant to defend long-standing diplomatic traditions regarding rules of the world order. Additionally, the Russian invasion will impact the Biden administration’s interest in applying Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions on India for the country’s purchase of air defense missile systems from Russia along with India’s overall relationship with Russia. 

Similarly, Beijing remains cautious in determining how to approach the conflict because they do not want to risk being penalized by the U.S. or the international world order for hasty decision-making. Taiwan is among four Asian partners (alongside Australia, Japan, and Singapore) that have agreed to implement strict export controls on Russia. This sets up a stark contrast with China, which will likely help Russia evade sanctions. By lending its support to the U.S. and allied efforts to punish Putin for his aggression, Taiwan is building good relations with Washington and drawing a favorable contrast between itself and China.

In response to the Ukraine-Russia conflict, U.S. President Joe Biden and other prominent world leaders have introduced a slew of sanctions to be imposed on the Russian state and oligarchy, a move which Chinese officials are hesitant to fall behind. In response to one reporter, China’s assistant foreign minister, Hua Chunying, was bombarded with reporters asking whether she would call Russia’s attack an invasion but avoided giving a straightforward yes or no response. In response to one reporter, Hua appeared frustrated at the question and said, “The U.S. has been fueling the flame, fanning up the flame, how do they want to put out the fire?” All things considered, China’s hesitance to maintain or even project a firm stance on the conflict was evident that they were likely to sympathize with Russia. 

After the long-feared Russian invasion of Ukraine began on Thursday, Tong Zhao, a senior fellow in the Beijing-based Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stated “China is clearly sympathetic to Russian perspectives.” However, “because Russia is now receiving wide international condemnation and criticism, I think China wants to avoid being seen as part of this axis,” Zhao said. But “when it comes to public statements, China has been very careful,” he said. “It's hard for China to openly support this Russian behavior given these implications for China’s own security and China’s relationship with Taiwan.”Beijing’s repeated declaration of its intent to reunify with Taiwan is something that must be watched closely. The island sits just off the coast of mainland China and is democratically self-governed, but is claimed by the People’s Republic of China. Much like Ukraine, it is a contested piece of territory sitting next to a country with neo-imperialist ambitions. 

Strategically, China would be wise to continue monitoring the situation in Ukraine closely, as the conflict is bringing much more attention to Taiwan. If China were to attack Taiwan, the U.S. would have no choice but to intervene to retain blatant aggression from its two geopolitical rivals. Both Jude Blanchette and Bonny Lin observed in the “Asia Forecast 2022” panel, held by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), that Xi Jinping would scrutinize a U.S. response to a Ukraine-Russia military conflict to predict how the United States would react if China decided to take military action against Taiwan. Given the opportunity, China would likely waste no time seizing the sovereign state. Experts predict, however, that China will likely wait to make any major moves until the end of Taiwan’s midterm elections in late 2022 because Xi would want to ensure victory. In the CSIS panel, Lin also argued that it would be unlikely that China launches a full-scale invasion this year because there will be no significant change in Taiwan to impact Xi’s motivations to reunify until the late 2022 midterm elections. 

The Ukraine-Russia conflict may be a strategic learning opportunity for China, as they see in real-time how the U.S. may react to an attack on a democratic state. While China is unlikely to make major moves to reclaim Taiwan this year, the conflict in Eastern Europe still sets the stage for what other Asian allies can expect from U.S. interventionism in Asia and the Asian-Pacific. The U.S. needs to maintain focus on the conflict in Ukraine as well as the situation between China and Taiwan, as missteps or poor strategic thinking could jeopardize diplomacy with Asian allies in the future.

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