A relationship built upon contingency understandably raises questions pertaining to its sustainability. Nonetheless, relationships of necessity are relationships in their own right, and it is important first to underscore the underlying motives pertaining to said relationships. India’s relationship with Australia has remarkably strengthened in recent years. The Australian government cites India as one of its “most important Indo-Pacific partners,” a sentiment mirrored by the Indian Minister of Commerce Piyush Goyal’s assertion that both nations harbor friendship and trust for each other “at the highest level”. Both nations are members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Japan and the United States. 

Together, the four nations desire to uphold the United States’ hegemony in the Indo-Pacific to sustain a “rules-based international order,” as stated in the alliance’s communique following the recent G-20 Summit and combating Chinese aggression. Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was a firm proponent of the alliance’s potential, going so far as to assert that it was the key to preserving a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” With this in mind, it cannot be denied that the viability of this burgeoning Indo-Australian relationship will hold the potential to cement the current international order decisively. 

The greater cooperation between these states is evidenced by their collective efforts to harp upon their economic, military, and cultural compatibility. During his meeting with the Australian Minister for Trade, Don Farrell, Indian Minister of Commerce Piyush Goyal emphasized the desire for both states to expand their trade to $100 billion. Australia has also invited India to participate in its Talisman Saber Exercises, which are military simulations that practice defensive measures against China. Furthermore, it is also important to consider the emphasis that has been placed on a cultural middle ground between both states, as well as the imagery surrounding their rejuvenated partnership. For instance, it was aboard the Indian INS Vikrant, the first aircraft carrier that India built domestically, that Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese stressed India’s status as a “top-tier partner” for Australia. This is particularly significant given the nature of a potential war in the Indo-Pacific. 

Should war erupt in the Indo-Pacific, it would be heavily centered around naval conflict, lending to the heightened importance of the Indian Ocean and, by extension, India’s cooperation as well. In this sense, it cannot be denied that a stronger mutual relationship certainly caters to not only the domestic interests of both states, but foreign policy interests as well, particularly with regard to the message they seek to send to the international community with regard to China. The alliance is unsurprising given the territorial conflicts that India is embroiled in with China, as well as the slew of Chinese-imposed economic sanctions that Australia is currently facing. 

However, despite Australia and India possessing tumultuous relationships with China, India may not be the most reliable ally. With regard to the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, at the United Nations, India has abstained from voting for motions to condemn the war. The Australian government has taken its support of India a step further and chosen to overlook India’s close ties with Moscow in an effort to prioritize their current relationship with each other. For instance, Foreign Secretary of India Harsh Vardhan Shringla remarked that Australia has “expressed understanding of India’s position on the issue of Ukraine,” alluding to India’s long-standing relationship with Russia and dependence on Russian military exports. Some scholars argue that aside from economic incentives, India likely seeks to maintain its relationship with Russia due to Russia’s close ties with China, hoping it might function as a more effective mediator in a conflict with the East Asian power. 

However, as scholar and analyst Felix K. Chang of the Foreign Policy Research Institute argued, Western assistance evidently supersedes any support Russia could potentially provide India with. Ukraine’s Ukraine’s lofty resistance, alone, serves as a salient example of this argument as it has been bolstered heavily by assistance from the United States of America. On the other hand, however, the hesitation experienced by India toward relying on the United States and other western powers, like Australia, to fulfill this contingent need is understandable, given its disapproval of the United States’ close military ties to Pakistan. 

Nonetheless, with the China question bringing both nations in closer relational proximity to each other, the situation appears to be evolving to require not just greater Indian commitment but the initiative in brokering peace, especially with China–a phenomenon that might arguably only be possible if India adopts a clear, firm stance, and prioritizes the maintenance of its more viable long-term alliances. For the time being, considering India’s strategic behaviors, the assertion that genuinely rings true is Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s statement that India’s present object remains to “[identify] and [exploit] opportunities created by global contradictions.”

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