In February 2023, the European Commission brought Poland’s case in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union. This determination was provoked by Poland’s rejection of the Commission’s July Infringement Decisions, in which the European Commission (EC) gave Poland two months to address the rule-of-law concerns. However, developments in European politics have added a new dimension to the conflict in recent years that may have tipped the scales in favor of Law and Justice (PiS), Poland’s ruling populist right-wing party. The party’s success has been attributed to Poland’s growing role in NATO leadership, demonstrating its rise to a critical European power. 

Poland’s pivotal role in providing military and humanitarian assistance has strengthened the country's negotiating power in NATO, especially in war intervention, defense planning, and upcoming projects. Having already a significant number of mutual members in both organizations, in 2016, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the President of the European Council Donald Tusk, and the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker issued a joint declaration of increased cooperation between NATO and the EU. Poland’s increasingly important role in the security organization, resulting from its leadership after the 2022 invasion, “has the potential to change Europe’s internal dynamic, shifting NATO’s center of gravity away from the Franco-German tandem.” Having warned the West of Putin’s expansionary vision for Russia for over a decade, Poland increased its credibility on the world stage. Poland’s prediction proved that the EU should have listened. 

Even after the 2014 invasion of Crimea, Germany disregarded the rhetoric of its Eastern Union partners and developed close ties with the Kremlin. Germany even became dependent on Russia for gas and oil through initiatives like the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, a highly criticized project that began in 2015 after Russia annexed Ukrainian territory. When Poland tried to block the initiative in 2018, Germany granted permission for the pipeline to be built in German waters. Former Prime Minister of Poland and former President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, remarked that “Germany's reliance on Russian gas can effectively limit European sovereignty, I have no doubt” and stressed that “Central and Eastern Europe's dependence on Russian gas gives Mr. Putin too much leverage.” 

While Poland was diversifying its energy sources and working towards energy independence, Germany fortified its relationship with Russia, even after Russia displayed aggression by annexing Crimea. Although Germany has since broken this tie with Russia, the initial closeness portrays Germany as naive and has become a "symbol of failed German energy policy". Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel defended her decision to buy large amounts of gas from Russia, saying that “from the perspective of that time, it was very rational and understandable” and was important in Germany’s “transitional” period as the country moved away from nuclear and coal power. Her successor Olaf Scholz suspended the pipeline in response to Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. 

However, Scholz’s government has been criticized for “acting too slowly” in restructuring Germany’s defense policy. Wolfgang Ischinger, a former German ambassador to the US, said that “Scholz didn’t want to put his head above the parapet” when describing the country’s reluctance to take on a leadership role in the conflict. Sophia Besch, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that Washington would have wanted to see Germany shape the movement aiding Ukraine in the conflict. Germany’s hesitant stance has been representative of the West’s reactions and overly cautious approaches to Russia’s 2022 invasion, which resulted in a decline in the country’s credibility. Meanwhile, Poland has only gained political capital in the conflict, even suggesting that former communist territories might join Poland in creating an opposition bloc in the EU. Piotr Buras from the European Council on Foreign Relations even suggests that “Huge disappointment with Germany’s response to the war, which extends far beyond nationalist circles, fuels visions in Poland of building a new axis with the Scandinavian and Baltic states.”

The rise of Poland’s international standing is particularly important, as Polish-Hungarian relations have deteriorated since the start of the war. Jarsoław Kaczyński, leader of the PiS and often called Poland's de facto leader, slammed Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán for siding with Russia in the conflict. Since then, the two former allies have not reconciled. However, Hungary’s approval of Finland's membership in NATO is seen as part of its process of distancing itself from Russia. Orbán has also been shifting away from Russian resources, which could aid the reconciliation between Hungary and Poland. If Poland and Hungary return to a friendly relationship, creating a Baltic opposition bloc becomes more probable and explains Hungary’s approval of Finland. 

Poland and Hungary have protected each other in the past against disciplinary action from the EU. Hungary had posed a major obstacle to EU efforts to impose sanctions on Poland between the onset of the 2015 Constitutional Crisis and the 2022 war in Ukraine by blocking the required unanimous vote to invoke sanctions using Article 7. Back in 2016, Hungary announced that it would veto any sanctions and disciplinary actions, thereby preventing disciplinary action by the EU. More recently, when the EU tried to include a rule-of-law clause in their COVID-19 recovery fund, Hungary and Poland vetoed it. In the European Council, to avoid vulnerability to future sanctions and disciplinary measures, Poland must solidify at least one veto ally as such decisions in the European Council require unanimous approval to pass. Otherwise, the EU might be able to end the nearly decade-long conflict once and for all. 

Hungary’s veto protection of Poland has been crucial in preventing the EU from taking a hard stance against Poland. Since 2015, Poland and the EU have been at odds over PiS’s violation of rule-of-law. Most recently, the EU used the COVID recovery fund as leverage to demand the closure of the Disciplinary Chamber, a tool created by PiS to ensure judges rule according to the party’s rhetoric. Even though Poland disbanded the organ, the EU still ruled that simply closing the chamber is not enough, as there are more milestones to be met if Poland is to receive the recovery money. 

However, this ruling may backfire: with Poland’s new-found self-confidence on the international stage, Kaczyński has voiced his anger with the EU's decision that closing the judicial Disciplinary Chamber was insufficient. Kaczyński has publicly criticized the EU for interfering in Polish politics, stating that PiS has kept its side of the bargain and that the EU is using Poland’s breaches of rule-of-law as an excuse to infiltrate Polish politics. Having recently gained more prestige, the Polish Law and Justice party may be a threat to stability in the EU as they can use their credibility in foreign policy to gather the support of the anti-EU theory and create a bloc of Eastern European countries which would push back against EU’s rule-of-law proceedings and veto in favor of Poland when necessary. 

Donald Tusk’s return to politics creates favorable conditions for the PiS government to fire at the former Prime Minister and the European Union. Tusk, having served as the European Council’s president from 2019 to 2022, has returned to Poland’s Civic Platform, a party which he co-founded and led to electoral victory in 2007. PiS has accused the EU of infiltrating Polish politics through Donald Tusk’s leadership of the Civic Platform. This provides reasonable doubt for PiS voters who believe the EU’s rule-of-law movement descends from its desire to influence domestic politics. For example, funds are withheld from Poland just when the former president of the European Council returns to Polish politics and “gears up to try and dethrone the country’s incumbent eurosceptic regime.” The unfortunate timeline of events creates a favorable narrative that propels PiS’ agenda forward.   

The narrative of EU infiltration in Polish politics and its ongoing battle over the rule of law could stunt attempts to weaken PiS’ public image. One must also consider the timing of the most recent actions the EU has undertaken in its battle with Poland over the rule of law. With upcoming parliamentary elections in the fall of 2023, the EU would have ample time to weaken Poland’s international standing by publically recalling its earlier unconstitutional actions. 

In light of Poland’s international reputation overshadowing PiS's unconstitutional actions, recent actions in the battle over Poland’s rule of law could mark the EU’s last attempts to significantly weaken the Law and Justice public image before the elections. As of February 21, 2023, PiS is the clear favorite with 36 percent of expected votes, with Civic Platform’s coalition, Koalicja (Coalition), having only 22 percent of the votes. Since PiS’ current strongest attribute is Poland’s international standing, every chance at weakening this position gives a chance to the liberal opposition to gain an advantage over Kaczyński. PiS has contributed to the EU's polarization and aggravated the organization's tensions. The EU’s rule-of-law proceedings may be the opposition’s last chance to stop the Law and Justice eurosceptic conservative agenda before Poland’s PiS burns bridges in the EU by creating permanent opposition blocs.

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