On December 7th, 2023, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that the country would hold early presidential elections in February 2024 instead of in 2025, when his current term expires. Ilham Aliyev and his family maintain an iron grip on power in Azerbaijan. He has been in power since 2003 after he inherited the position from his father, Heydar Aliyev, who served as president from 1993-2003 after coming to power in a coup against then President Abulfaz Elchibey. 

According to Freedom House, since the beginning of the Aliyevs’ rule over the country, none of the elections that have taken place have been considered "credible or competitive" by international observers. They have been marred by electoral fraud and a boycott of major opposition parties. The current First Lady of Azerbaijan, Mehriban Aliyeva, is also active in government, assuming the role of vice president since the position was created in 2017. There is also a strong cult of personality around the family, centered on Heydar Aliyev, with numerous public spaces such as airports, streets, cultural centers, and parks named after him. The Aliyev family created and uses this cult of personality to ensure its central role in Azerbaijan by portraying themselves as “saviors” of the nation. 

 It is not surprising that many NGOs and watchdog groups consider Azerbaijan to be one of the most authoritarian states in the world, with no free elections, free speech, or freedom of expression and assembly. Therefore, an interesting question arises: Why did Ilham Aliyev call early elections? Given the authoritarian system present in Azerbaijan, it would not be difficult to imagine that even if these elections were held in 2025, as initially scheduled, Ilham Aliyev would win with a comfortable margin and little opposition through another staged election. However, it seems that there are a few potential factors that could have influenced his decision to call early elections. These factors range from regional, domestic, and international issues.

The most significant of these factors seems to be the outcome of Azerbaijan’s recent offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. The offensive, which came after a nearly year-long blockade of the region, saw the flight of the region's predominantly Armenian population and the establishment of control over the entirety of Nagorno-Karabakh. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh began in 1988 during the end of the Soviet Union when Karabakh Armenians embarked on a movement to secede from Azerbaijan after decades of mistreatment. A conflict soon erupted that lasted until a ceasefire was brokered by Russia in 1994. By this time, local Karabakh Armenians, with support from Armenia, established control over Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding districts, which Azerbaijan vowed to bring under its control.

 In 2020, after decades of ceasefire violations and stalled negotiations, Azerbaijan was able to take control of the seven districts and a part of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. With Nagorno-Karabakh now without its indigenous Armenian inhabitants and under complete  Azerbaijani control since late 2023, Aliyev has gained the ability to claim victory in the long-standing conflict and present himself as a strong leader to the Azerbaijani public. Since the offensive, Aliyev has regularly appeared in Nagorno-Karabakh in military fatigues (despite never having served in the military) while presiding over a parade and walking over the flag of the local Armenian population during a visit to the now deserted government buildings that the Karabakh government used.

Aliyev has not been shy about utilizing nationalism to further his domestic political goals. He gloated about his personal role in creating the present status quo and used degrading terms to describe the former Armenian leaders of the region. These steps are arguably an effort on the part of Aliyev to present himself as the face of the recent offensive and ultimately turn the high levels of nationalism in Azerbaijan into support for his regime. The rise in support for his regime could turn into increased legitimacy for Aliyev in Azerbaijan and internationally through an election that would see higher levels of genuine support for the ruling government as the Azerbaijani public is distracted from other problems in the country such as a slowing economy due to excessive dependence on hydrocarbons and corruption. To ensure that post-war euphoria remains high, the public remains distracted from other issues, and that the government receives positive media coverage ahead of the elections, the Azerbaijani government has commenced a large-scale crackdown against various independent media outlets and reporters. These groups and individuals were engaged in investigative journalism and anti-corruption activism. These include journalists from the AbzasMedia, Kanal 11, and Kanal 13 news outlets.

Additionally, several global factors, including relations with the West and the outcome of geopolitically significant conflicts, might also be playing into Aliyev’s considerations to hold elections before 2025. The United States will have presidential and congressional elections in 2024, as will the European Parliament (the legislative body of the EU). If Aliyev has a new seven-year mandate before these elections, he will be more secure in his position while dealing with the potential new governments or parties in power in Washington, D.C. and Brussels. He will be less fearful of unrest caused by geopolitical developments that could arise from Azerbaijani relations with the West. Potential domestic backlash regarding Azerbaijan’s relations with the West is especially important due to an increased interest of Western powers in the region.

The EU maintains a monitoring mission on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the U.S. is trying to mediate a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If Azerbaijan is pressured publicly by the West within the next year to accept a potential agreement with Armenia, a decrease of the nationalist atmosphere in Azerbaijan could occur, which may have a direct impact over time on Aliyev’s popularity, something that could be dangerous before conducting a sham election. Alternatively, the high amounts of nationalism may persist and, as a result of being pressured by the West, the Azerbaijani public may start to see Aliyev as a leader incapable of living up to his nationalist rhetoric. Such an outcome could be very dangerous for an authoritarian whose main legitimacy comes from nationalism and being able to project himself as a strong leader. Aliyev may also want to secure his place within Azerbaijan before any possible geopolitical shifts from conflicts in Ukraine or the Middle East materialize, all of which are less likely to end by February 2024 but may well be concluded by 2025 with noticeable geopolitical shifts having occurred by then.

Ultimately, Aliyev himself, in a recent interview with Azerbaijani government-controlled media, may have indicated the importance of quickly renewing his mandate and strengthening his hold on power. During the interview, Aliyev revived Azerbaijani demands for a corridor through Armenia to its exclave of Nakhchivan and ultimately to Turkey. Despite such a route going through Armenian territory, Azerbaijan has demanded that Armenia not have customs or border control on that route. When referring to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, Aliyev remarked that the border “will pass where we [Azerbaijan] believe it should.” He also mocked recent arms sales to Armenia, saying, “No matter what weapons are given to Armenia. it will not help them.” While Aliyev likely does want to consolidate his power further before the euphoria of the conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh wears off and before any potential changes in power in the West occur, his comments seem to suggest that a new mandate may prove to be beneficial in new attacks (in addition to past clashes in 2021 and 2022) against internationally recognized Armenian territory, further increasing nationalist sentiments and more support for his regime.