A Steep Price to Prevent Protest: Egypt's New Capital Forged from Fear of Insurrection
In 2015, President of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi announced plans to build a new Egyptian capital 30 miles outside of Cairo to mitigate the crippling overpopulation which has smothered the city for decades. Official images of the plan emphasize its innovation and excellence, including the tallest building in Africa, open green spaces, and a new presidential palace inspired by the Egyptian Pharaonic gods.While the Egyptian government insists that the new administrative capital’s purpose is to promote economic advancement, opponents criticize the project’s lack of affordable housing and public transportation. Furthermore, it is widely believed that the new capital is intended to establish a center of government far from the legacy and threat of revolution written on the streets, bridges, and squares of Cairo. A new capital far removed from voices of dissent will safeguard the Egyptian government from future revolution and strengthen its military and economic power, while stripping the economy of funding needed to support the populations struggling from overcrowding and lack of government resources.
The source of el-Sisi’s alleged anxieties can likely be traced back to the 2011 Arab Spring protests that led to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s president for three decades. The most influential protests during the revolution pulsed through the heart of Cairo in Tahrir Square, which is situated nearby many government buildings, including the Egyptian Parliament. Protestors occupied Tahrir Square for 18 days, setting up roadblocks between government buildings and restricting the flow of traffic throughout the city. The occupation of Tahrir Square symbolized an occupation of Egypt’s center of power, and protestors’ control of this pivotal location successfully triggered regime changes. As former leader of the military in 2013, the year he seized power, el-Sisi has not forgotten the revolutionary potential of Tahrir Square. After initially seizing power, he instructed the military to repress protestors with force – killing 800 Egyptians at Rabi’a Square. Since then, the government has punished journalists, shut down political dissidents, and heavily restricted free speech. Relocating Egypt’s capital signifies his most recent and effective campaign against popular protest.
Overpopulation has afflicted Cairo for decades. Following Egypt’s liberation from British occupation in 1954, millions of Egyptians moved to Cairo in search of better housing opportunities and working conditions. The city’s boundaries were unable to expand to accommodate this population boom: surrounding areas were either farmland or inhospitable desert. Farmers began to sell plots of land to newcomers, creating “informal” neighborhoods, often breaking zoning laws. As the population of Cairo increased, so did these illegal neighborhoods; today, 60 percent of Cairo’s population lives in these locations. For decades, the government of Egypt has neglected to invest in affordable housing or public services in order to mitigate overpopulation. Currently, Cairo’s population density is 153,606 people per square kilometer, surpassing those of New York City, London, and Shanghai. Moreover, because these neighborhoods are not recognized by the government and therefore remain unregulated, they have become increasingly tightly packed with residents, causing a health, public safety, and economic crisis in the country.
The narrative pushed by el-Sisi’s government is that informal neighborhoods are to blame for the crisis, deflecting government responsibility back to the populations suffering from the lack of public investment, affordable housing, and regulation. The administration has released plans to eradicate Cairo’s informal neighborhoods by 2030 to create space for more luxury residential areas, increasing the pressure on affordable housing outside the city limits. It is improbable that those currently occupying the informal neighborhoods will be able to afford housing in the new city. A two bedroom apartment in the new capital will sell for $50,000 while Egypt’s GDP per capita is about $3,000 and the average price of a three bedroom apartment in Cairo is around $400 dollars a month. No plan has been made by the government to fund or assist in the creation of affordable housing – setting a time bomb on the livelihood of Cairo’s citizens. The city’s housing crisis persists despite criticism and dissent, and el-Sisi appears determined that the new capital is the right solution.
In Egypt, the problem of overcrowding is not new and, to a certain extent, neither is el-Sisi’s solution – Egyptian leaders have been building cities in the desert since the end of British occupation with no success in mitigating poverty and overcrowding. The first attempt at constructing a new capital outside of Cairo was Gamal Abdel Nasser’s plan in the 1960s to build Nasser City. Since then, Egyptian heads of state have constructed eight desert cities, most providing only luxury housing with no methods of public transportation, barring anyone who does not own a car from access. Today, these cities remain only partially occupied due to their economic and physical inaccessibility. The current situation of overpopulation in Cairo is a result of decades of misguided policy that has directed large amounts of money towards creating new, expensive cities instead of investing in infrastructure to aid struggling populations.
El-Sisi’s new capital is estimated to cost $59 billion dollars over the span of six years, an astounding sum in light of the country’s recent economic downturn. Egypt relies heavily on imported goods and foreign borrowing, both of which have been crippled by global supply chain problems. Goldman Sachs estimates that Egypt will need a $15 billion dollar bailout from the IMF to evade its economic crisis. However, the IMF has granted the government three loans totaling $20 billion. This accompanies bailouts from powerful allies in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE who have invested $22 billion in Egypt so far in 2022 alone. American military and economic aid has also flowed into the country since 1978. Despite this international assistance, Egypt’s citizens are still paying the price of the new capital. The government has been implementing tighter import rules, privatizing state owned enterprises, and devaluing the local currency in order to mitigate the exit of foreign capital, rising prices, and decline of tourism.
The Egyptian military also plays a role in directing money away from the civilian population. For instance, the supposedly privately owned company overseeing the project, the Administrative Capital for Urban Development, is 51 percent owned by the military. The military’s role in funding and overseeing civilian economic affairs blurs the lines between military and public control of the country. Additionally, the military continues to receive benefits for funding the project such as pocketing the profits from constructing government buildings in Cairo. Ultimately, the Egyptian military indirectly exerts political power over the country through its control of the jobs required to bring these projects to fruition.
Moving Egypt’s capital out of the reach of millions of citizens oppressed by economic depletion and civil hardship represents a tactical move by el-Sisi to cement his rule over the country. The lack of affordable housing and public transportation in the new capital will make it impossible to stage protests as successful as those of the Arab Spring. Masked as a push towards innovation and rejuvenation, Egypt’s new capital will physically and symbolically amputate the connection between the civilian population and their voice in the political system.
Construction of the new administrative capital is split into three stages, with the first of those completed in the early summer of 2022. Little is known about the timeline of the next two stages of the construction of the new capital; since the introduction of the plan in 2015, the project has seen many changes.
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