Progress in Peril: Tunisian Civil Society’s Role in Progressive Politics
In the only surviving democracy of the post-Arab Spring era, Tunisia's robust civil society has been accredited by numerous scholars as the country's primary democratizing force. However, the role of Tunisian civil society organizations (CSOs) has greatly fluctuated throughout the last two decades and is under threat once again today. Since the country gained independence in 1956, authoritarian rule has stifled any CSOs that failed to reflect the interests of the governing regime. In 1959, Tunisia’s Ministry of Interior approved Law 154 on Associations, decreeing that only those organizations which receive authorization from the state and remain in the state’s favor would be allowed to operate.
Civil society faced still greater challenges under the authoritarian regime of former President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, with the majority of CSOs functioning as extensions of Ben Ali’s rule. His approval of Organic Laws no. 88-90 of 1988 and 92-95 of 1992 further limited the activities of civil society. In the case of Organic Law no.88, for example, Article 3 states that a group may not base its principles and activities on religious, linguistic, racial, sexual, or religious grounds. By extension, Article 3 gives authorities cause “to stop citizens forming a party that draws its main inspiration from, for example, Islam, the advancement of women’s interests, or particular regional interests”.
Despite such legal restrictions, a handful of CSOs remained critical of the government, notable examples being: Amnesty International, the Tunisian Human Rights League, the Tunisian General Labor Union, and the Progressive Democratic Party. These organizations function within a strong network with significant overlapping membership. Moreover, international recognition has enabled such groups to maintain their activities without major repercussions, despite operating under the constant threat of persecution. During a period of stark unemployment, poverty, food inflation, corrupt authorities, and restricted political freedoms, these CSOs represented the Tunisian public’s opposition to the injustices of the Ben Ali regime.
It wasn’t until 2010 that this opposition to the government culminated in the Jasmine Revolution, sparked by the self-immolation of 27-year-old street-vendor Mohamed Bouazizi. The uprising was primarily maintained by the aforementioned “semi-illegal” CSOs, which helped to politicize the movement, represent the protesters in negotiations with the regime, and coordinate between various protest leaders. After two months of mass demonstrations against unemployment and political repression, Ben Ali fled the country, and an interim government was promptly established. Shortly thereafter, Decree Law 88 replaced Law 154 on Associations, ruling that “both Tunisians and resident foreigners may freely establish civil society organizations, carry out a broad range of activities, lobby the authorities regarding laws and policies, speak publicly about their work and opinions, and receive foreign funding without government authorization” according to Amnesty International.
The aftermath of the revolution brought with it rapid growth in the number and activities of CSO’s. Between 2011 and 2013 alone, almost 5,000 new civil society associations emerged. Post-revolution optimism and a boom in civic activism pushed Tunisians young and old to participate in civil society. CSOs played a major role in guiding Tunisia’s political transition after the ousting of Ben Ali and advising the interim government; in February of 2011, 28 political parties and CSOs came together to form the ‘National Council for the Protection of the Revolution,’ and another group of CSOs merged to form the ‘Higher Authority for the Realization of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform, and the Democratic Transition’ the next month. Following the election of the National Constituent Assembly in October of 2011, civil society was at the forefront of the constitutional drafting process, engaging in democratic debates regarding a number of controversial topics, such as women’s rights and the role of religion in government.
Tunisian civil society flourished after the 2011 revolution, establishing Tunisia as the paragon of robust civil society in the Middle East. As of 2022, a striking 24,504 CSOs are registered with government authorities. Following the assassinations of Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi in 2013, four CSOs earned the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize for successfully organizing national dialogues in order to prevent an incipient political crisis. These CSOs, three of which were notably vocal in their opposition under the Ben Ali regime, were granted the award for their “decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution of 2011” according to the Norwegian Nobel Committee.
In October of 2019, Tunisia’s democratically elected President Kais Saied was sworn into office after a landslide victory: the Tunisian public felt largely optimistic that this populist leader would successfully represent their interests. However, on July 25, 2021, Kais Saied staged a self-coup, during which he dissolved parliament, dismissed the prime minister, and implemented rule by decree.
The following February, a draft law proposing significant regulations on civil society was leaked. In an attempt to further consolidate power by weakening intermediary structures, Saied’s draft law would give government authorities sweeping powers to ban CSOs, prohibit foreign funding without government authorization, weaken restrictions on state involvement with CSOs, and limit CSOs’ rights to access information, publish reports, and hold meetings. In the days following the leak, President Saied addressed the international community in a speech claiming that CSOs are merely “extensions of foreign powers, which seek to control the Tunisian people through their money,” and that Tunisian civil society groups were receiving external funding to serve foreign interests and interfere with domestic politics.
The draft law sparked outrage in Tunisia and abroad. In the weeks following the President's speech, prominent civil society activists like Mohamed Yassine Jelassi, President of the Tunisian Journalists Union, took to the streets to hold and speak at protests. The international community has responded to the draft law with great concern, and a number of Tunisian and international human rights groups called on President Saied to scrap it. These organizations include among others: Amnesty International, Arab Reform Initiative, Human Rights Watch, Lawyers Without Borders, “The Monitors”, “The International Observatory on Associations and Sustainable Development”, and the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights. According to the Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defender, the draft law would provide Tunisian authorities “with legal tools to control and foreseeably muzzle civil society”. A number of these groups have also noted that the draft law infringes upon the right to freedom of association as enshrined in Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
President Saied’s proposed draft law draws a number of striking parallels to that of the aforementioned 1950s-era Law 154 on Associations. Both legislations require government approval for the creation of CSOs. They also demand government oversight, grant the ruling party full authority to dissolve the organization, and subject CSO leaders to arrest and fines if their activities do not align with the interests of the state. The implementation of this draft law would once again restrain Tunisian civil society from operating freely and defending the rights of the people. According to the Middle East and North Africa Regional Director at Amnesty International, “Tunisians know from experience the dangers that restrictive laws can pose to civil society and public debate”.
While the true success of Tunisia’s Arab Spring protests in implementing systemic pro-democracy measures remains hotly debated by scholars, the recent leaked proposal signifies that any gains made by Tunisian civil society since the 2011 revolution are under serious threat of government reversal. If President Kais Saied should choose to approve the draft law (a process that would not be subject to debate by Parliament since its dissolution in 2021), the law will immediately go into effect as decree. Doing so would reverse the progress made in post-revolution Tunisia, and once again stifle the country’s civil society. Without civil society actors to hold the government accountable, Tunisia’s democratic transition may very well revert back to the authoritarian administration of Ben Ali. It is crucial that Decree 88 be upheld to protect civil society and the progress made since the Jasmine Revolution, and to ensure that CSOs may operate without fear of repression.
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