The Political Propensity for Peace
Image courtesy of Su San Lee via Unsplash
What does it mean to function as a deterrent? Does it mean to prevent conflict or simply delay it? Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy has raised these questions in the context of maintaining broader global peace. Particularly, it has raised the question of whether interdependence and globalization remain sufficient for sustaining the current global order. The Japanese government’s declaration of its lack of faith in the current international system is especially striking about this report. Detailing its newly expanded military budget, the report boasts claims such as “globalization and interdependence alone cannot serve as a guarantor for peace and development” and “the boundary between military and non-military fields is no longer clear-cut either.” In this sense, the Japanese government has made it clear that it no longer views security as a solitary issue but instead as a pervasive element in all sectors of its foreign relations. This new view of security could lead to the fear that Japan’s amplified military investment might signal a decline in the effectiveness of diplomacy as a tool to promote peace.
The report aims to help the Japanese government frame the increase in defense spending as a defensive measure against potential incursions rather than an offensive strategy. Whether the motivations outlined in the report are genuine, for the purpose of analysis, it is important to consider them to be genuine, as they represent the manner in which Japan is to be viewed by the international community. Therefore, it is imperative to consider the implications of a world power such as Japan, with its degree of assets and agency, making such a claim.
The first consideration is the response of Japan’s allies to its declaration. The United States has openly expressed support for Japan’s new policy, with the U.S. State Department issuing the following statement: “We applaud Japan’s commitment to modernize our alliance through increased investment in enhanced roles, missions, and capabilities and closer defense cooperation with the United States and other Allies”. The United States’ endorsement of Japan’s strategy highlights doubts concerning whether Japan’s new military acquisitions stand to only be used defensively, given the United States’ own burgeoning military capabilities.
It would be impulsive, however, to perceive this alliance solely as a unique, potential root of conflict since the United States and Japan have long maintained a dynamic military alliance dating back to the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Instead, it is also important to consider Japan’s individual interests within its precarious relationship with China. For instance, it cannot be denied that the expansion comes at a time of steadily increasing Chinese presence surrounding the disputed Senkaku Islands.
In this sense, it can be argued that U.S. support is perhaps simply a product of its alliance with Japan and its own contentions pertaining to Chinese hegemony. Alternatively, for Japan, the urgency arising from its territorial dispute with China lends to the argument that its decision to expand likely pertains to present uncertainty rather than achieving dominance in Asia in the long run. This, however, does not dismiss the possibility that within Japanese remilitarization may lie such reticent motives.
The second consideration is the Japanese government’s perspective regarding the reasons contributing to heightened global risk. According to the 2022 National Security Strategy, the government cites “nations, not sharing universal values, or political and economic systems based on such values in common, are expanding their influences, thereby manifesting risks around the globe.” Although the reference to “nations” can be interpreted as deliberately vague, it is worth considering the validity of the statement.
In recent years, the United States’s status as the “Leader of the Free World” has been questioned due to stark deviations from its traditional foreign policy–for instance, in terms of its reduction in degree of involvement in military operations such as Afghanistan. Originally, the moniker was adopted in reference to the United State’s hegemony, the largest military budget in the world, and continual emphasis on democratic freedom for all. It is, therefore, possible to argue that the Japanese government’s new strategy is a response to the insecurity felt due to the waning influence of the United States and a desire for a more hegemonic set of ideals within global diplomatic culture. This argument, however, could just as easily be rebuffed given the United State’s ardent support for Japan's National Security Strategy.
This is apparent when considering that Japan’s new strategy has much to do with its fear of Chinese aggression. For instance, in August 2022, China’s intermediate-range ballistic missiles landed within the range of Japan’s exclusive economic zone. Additionally, it is important to factor in the escalating potential for conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, the impetus of which could be argued to be the United States’ “robust unofficial relationship” with Taiwan. The late, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe himself affirmed, “A Taiwan contingency is a contingency for Japan. In other words, it is also a contingency for the Japan-U.S. alliance. People in Beijing, particularly President Xi Jinping, should not misjudge that.”
This perspective holds especially true given Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s assertion, “At the same time, diplomacy requires defense capabilities to back it up, and strengthening defense capabilities will also lead to persuasive power in diplomacy.” It would appear that despite Japan’s considerable soft power, it has chosen to revert to a more securitised notion of diplomacy. It can therefore be argued that Japan’s newly-expanded arsenal cannot solely be viewed as a deterrent, as it will play an active role in brokering cooperation between Japan and other states, and not simply serve as a potential negotiation mechanism. Perhaps then, it might be fair to argue that it does not function as a deterrent, and nor does it truly prevent conflict or delay it. Perhaps, it is in anticipation of conflict that such a strategy was crafted.
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