Deadly Protests in the Autonomous Region of Karakalpakstan over Changes in the Uzbek Constitution

Constitutional amendments implemented by Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyoyev in June of 2022 resulted in violent protests. Of the 200 people injured at least 18 people were killed, including members of law enforcement. The amendments prevented Karakalpakstan’s right to secede from Uzbekistan. They would effectively “downgrade its status to that of a province.” Most notably, the implementation of these changes would lead to a closer relationship between Karakalpakstan and the Tashkent government. Karakalpakstan would no longer be formally considered “sovereign.” The degree of chaos that came about as a result of these changes hasn’t been seen in Uzbekistan since the Andijan massacre of 2005, in which hundreds of civilians protesting against the government were killed in Andijan, a city in the Eastern part of Uzbekistan. After the massacre, anyone suspected of being connected to the protesters in any way — family members or witnesses — was in danger of being tortured or killed.

The nature of the Karakalpak protests is similar — the protests resulted in a state of emergency in the region that lasted one month. Journalists were detained and protestors were hit with rubber bullets and tear gas by security forces. An internet blackout was then instituted, resulting in a lot of confusion around the evolving crisis on an international scale. This further demonstrated the central government’s authoritarian tendencies and inability — or unwillingness — to deal with the protests in a more diplomatic manner. External forces “from abroad” were blamed for the unrest by the government, despite no evidence being found of these forces.

The abrupt change implemented by Mirziyoyev aligns with how the central government has been exerting influence and tight control over Karakalpakstan to prevent it from declaring independence for many years prior. It is crucial to note that these amendments were implemented without any consultation with the Karakalpak people, indicating a lack of respect for their culture and identity. The amendments also blatantly removed the right of Karakalpakstan to secede from Uzbekistan  — though it is unlikely that the Karakalpaks would truly secede from the country, considering the central government’s opposition, they at least had the safety of knowing that this option was available to them. Getting rid of it was the utmost sign of the degradation of their freedom. 

Aman Sagidullayev, the leader of a movement called “Alga Karakalpakstan” — which has vied for Karakalpakstan’s independence — has said, “We Karakalpaks, apart from freedom, do not need anything.” In his words, “a crime was committed against the Karakalpak people.” After speaking with the local parliament in Nukus, Mirziyoyev shortly reversed the changes to the Constitution. Could this reversal be representative of a fundamental shift in attitude from the government in Tashkent? Or did the reversal only come about because of the intensity of the protests — in other words, with the spotlight on Karakalpakstan, was Mirziyoyev simply left with no other choice?

While the catalyst of the protests were the Constitutional amendments, experts have said that the deeper cause was poor socio-economic conditions. Currently, the capital city of Karakalpakstan, Nukus, has extremely high rates of poverty and is more rural compared to other parts of the country. Because wages are so low, a sizable portion of the population relies on remittances from Russia or Kazakhstan. If these conditions are left unaddressed, the protests, which — fortunately for the stability of the region — have been abated for now, will only resume and grow in force at a different point in the future. Ultimately, the Karakalpak protests highlighted a disconnect between the Uzbek government and its people and showed how the central government inadequately responded to a situation that was in need of different remedies — ones that would’ve involved direct communication with locals and means of resolving their differences to find some sort of common ground, rather than brute force.

Furthermore, it is important to note that there are many factors that disincentivize it from allowing Karakalpakstan to secede — including the natural resources that lie in the region, primarily oil and natural gas. In any case, looking at the situation a year later, the reversal of the constitutional changes was undoubtedly a positive decision for the people of Karakalpakstan — but it is evident that tensions regarding the status of the region and its ties to Tashkent will continue for a long time to come.