Exploring The Case for a German National Security Council

Can Germany Meet Its Own Zeitenwende? Upon release of the inaugural National Security Strategy, questions remain about the country’s ability to meet its overly ambitious agenda. Such questions are well-founded, as ambiguity is present throughout. Therein lies no promises to close the Bundeswehr’s (armed forces) structural deficits, nor a commitment to permanently expand Germany’s military presence in NATO-allied countries. A closer look at Germany’s defense expenditure goals also finds shortcomings. The risk of relapse remains high, as expensive procurement plans cannot be extended indefinitely. The Strategy also attempts to solve a nearly impossible feat: meeting strategic goals with no additional strain on public finances. This in mind, growing pains can be expected, and credence should be given to a country whose historical legacy negates a strong military presence. As Atlantic Council Senior Fellow Roderick Kefferpütz asserts, the German National Security Strategy should still be applauded for what it is: a recognition that “burgeoning trade ties and diplomacy alone don’t provide security.” While the Traffic Light Coalition, comprising the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Free Democratic Party (FDP), and Alliance 90/The Greens, were able to come to the Strategy, a notable omission was the establishment of a National Security Council. 

While proposed, a United States-style National Security Council has become a political non-starter for The Greens, who lead the foreign ministry. They believe too much power would be vested in the Chancellorship, which Chancellor Olaf Scholz of the SPD currently holds. Compromise is what allowed for such an important Strategy, and what makes Germany’s coalition government so effective. But, in addition to a strong coalition, there must be efficient coordination. A National Security Council has the potential to streamline decision-making, formulate clear policy agendas, and better harmonize the many factions of Germany’s notoriously bureaucratic government. 

The infeasibility of the U.S.-style NSC in Germany is understandable. Possibly the greatest difference is the Cabinet structures between these respective countries. The power of the American executive branch is vested in one party, whose departments and agency Secretaries are appointed and correspond with the President’s party. This process is complicated in the Deutsch Cabinet, as department Ministers come from different coalitions. A myriad of other reasons muddle such a direct implementation, but the German government does hold the mechanisms to make a similar system work. The Bundessicherheitsrat (Federal Security Council) is the Cabinet’s current forum for security discussion, but whose responsibility has historically been limited to the approval of arms exports. With exception to military action in Afghanistan, all major decisions of the last two decades made by the Bundessicherheitsrat have revolved around the dispersion of battle tanks or submarines. While German law prohibits the centralization of all security powers, more can be done to coordinate unconventional initiatives in the way the U.S. might. Global public health, climate, international economics and migration are all concerns and talking points of the U.S. NSC, but do not fall as cleanly under the security umbrella of Germany. Such priorities should be recognized and discussed in a diverse security environment. 

Germany has other options to call upon in its debate, namely the United Kingdom’s interpretation of the National Security Council. Established in 2010 under former Prime Minister David Cameron, the model reflected, as ISPSW Senior Advisor Maxim Worcester puts it, “the increased complexity and interconnectivity of the risk faced by the country.” The American NSC was adopted to accommodate a centralized executive mechanism necessary for the Cold War. The U.K.’s more recent NSC prescribes no such centralization, but instead a more coherent national security policy that directly meets 21st century challenges. When it comes to security issues, Germany and the U.K. come with similar economic baggage. Both are inextricable importers of oil and gas and are threatened by supply chain disruptions. The lack of coordination on such disruptions was evident in Germany’s over-reliance on Russian energy during the start of the Ukraine War. The 2008 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United Kingdom emphasizes a “Unified approach,” not all that dissimilar from the “Integrated Security” attitude Germany’s NSS calls upon. The Chancellery and the Traffic Light Coalition have clearly identified the need for better collaboration. Stronger coordination and integration between departments avoids such risks and dependencies as inter-ministry cooperation could allow for more adaptability. Countries have finite resources, therefore making conversation between “defense, diplomacy, and development,” that much more important. 

However, there remains a gap between rhetoric and action in German policy-making. As Josef Janning of the European Council on Foreign Relations quips, “triviality of the country’s strategic debate” is its greatest weakness. Such hesitation is seen in Germany’s delay of Leopard 2 tanks to the Ukrainian battlefield. Despite being Europe’s largest producer of modern heavy tanks, Germany has continuously been slower than its neighboring allies in aiding Kyiv. While it is up to Germany to decide what, and how much to contribute to the war effort, their indecisiveness and foot-dragging is what remains less excusable. Howitzers, anti-aircraft guns, armored personnel vehicles and air defense systems arrived in short supply in October of 2022, eight-months after the initial invasion. More were promised in 2023, with similar hiccups occurring again. A strategy may clean up the procurement hiccups, and open dialogue, but without foundational support Germany may remain flatfooted compared to its neighbors. 

Germany is living in an epoch of multi-polarity in which it can no longer afford the culture of pacifism of the last three decades. While it is headed in the right direction, European democracy is on the defensive, and more is needed from the continent’s largest economy. With President Emmanuel Macron at France’s helm, and Poland’s ascending military prowess, Germany is no longer the de facto leader of Europe, as it was under the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel. However, Berlin remains willing to direct Europe’s future. To do so, internal differences must be transcended. Adopting an NSC should be a tailored process, one that balances tested frameworks with Germany’s own self-established doctrine. This will not solve all the ills of the country’s security framework, nor should that be expected. The German Economic Institute estimates that the, “historic underfunding of the Bundeswehr relative to NATO standards, is at least 394 billion euros.” This is no easy margin to close, but such institutional changes can equip Germany with the efficiency necessary to close this gap, and take on leadership responsibilities in Europe once again.