Forgotten in Fire: The Hidden Aftermath of the Wagner Group’s Mutiny
It's June 23, and chaos has erupted in Moscow. At 10:50am Moscow time, Yevgeny Prigozhin—leader of the Wagner Group, a Russian private military organization—released a video attacking the Russian Defense Ministry. In it he lampoons the ministry for its mishandling of the conflict in Ukraine, misleading Putin and the Russian people, and for trying to incorporate Wagner directly into the Russian military. He personally attacked Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and his subordinates who started the war, calling them “a handful of dipshits” who thought they were “so cunning that no one would realize what they were doing with their military exercises, and nobody would stop them when they went to Kyiv.” He further lamented how the “incompetently planned operation” in Ukraine led to losses of tens of thousands of troops. This kickstarted 36 hours of chaos, during which Wagner troops marched across the Ukrainian border into Russia, captured the cities of Rostov-on-Don and Voronezh and came within 200 kilometers of Moscow. Russian troops created barricades on the Oka river and a criminal investigation was opened into Prigozhin on charges of inciting an armed rebellion. Wagner’s troops even came close to capturing Russian nuclear weapons near Voronezh, being stopped only by a single locked door.
Yet only 36 hours after it began, it was over. Belarusian President Lukashenko got on the phone with Prigozhin and Putin separately and reached an agreement. In the deal, all 25,000 Wagner soldiers involved in the mutiny–including Prigozhin–would leave Russia for neighboring Belarus, rebellion charges against all involved would be dropped, and those not involved would sign contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry. When the dust settled 30 Russian soldiers lay dead, while six Russian helicopters and aircraft and five Wagner vehicles were destroyed. Yet in all of this, two questions have been sidelined in the discussion: what will become of Wagner’s global operations and what will Putin do with Prigozhin?
Around the globe—but largely in Africa—Wagner is involved in a variety of operations designed to promote Russian interest, simultaneously supporting dictators, perpetuating conflicts, and engaging in human rights abuses. But with Prigozhin exiled to Belarus and his influence dwindling in Ukraine, is Prigozhin capable of maintaining control over his forces in Africa? One could easily make the assumption that with Russian attempts to control the (allegedly disaffiliated) Wagner Group already under way, this would inevitably extend to Wagner’s position in Africa, yet this is far from the case. Just 4 days after the mutiny, an unnamed Russian envoy visited Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army, assuring them that Wagner forces “aren’t going anywhere,” and that while “there may be some changes at the top but the mechanism will stay the same.” He assured Libyan forces that “the people on the ground, the money men in Dubai, the contacts, and the resources [remain] committed to Libya.” This suggests attempts to remove Prigozhin–and other leadership figures–from Wagner, something Putin has confirmed in a recent interview with Russian media, and compounded by a recent raid on Prigozhin’s house. Still, Putin met with Prigozhin shortly after the mutiny, offering them “further options for employment and combat.” Prigozhin’s role remains in limbo while Putin is faced with a delicate balancing act: the crumbling solidarity of Russian troops, and his poorly concealed affinity for lethal retaliation against traitors.
Unfortunately, it’s undeniable the connections Wagner has in Africa are simply too valuable to Russia. Putin proved this again on July 16th, as several hundred experienced Wagner troops arrived in the Central African Republic on Moscow’s orders to ensure security in an upcoming constitutional referendum, and continue their protection of the Central African president. Furthermore, a separate transfer of Wagner troops was done between troops and trainers stationed in the Central African Republic and Belarus, rotating another group of soldiers into the same country. It appears that the mutually beneficial relationship between African countries and Russia through Wagner will continue. Russia recently confirmed that Wagner forces would not be withdrawn from Africa after concerns were raised by African nations after the mutiny. Instead, no abnormal actions have appeared in Wagner troop movements in Africa, and “business as usual” continues for Wagner. This appears to be a sentiment supported by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, saying that such relationships with African nations are “up to the leadership of those countries to decide.”
Not wanting to lose access to the relationships that Wagner provides, Russia appears to have reached an informal compromise where it exiles Prigozhin to Belarus, yet allows him to retain control—and responsibility—of his forces in Africa. This will inevitably perpetuate conflicts within Africa, where Wagner is supporting civil war in Sudan, committing crimes against humanity in the Central African Republic, and supporting Gaddafi’s son’s war of conquest in Libya, among other offenses. Despite Wagner’s mutiny, Putin has chosen to embrace selective amnesia regarding Wagner, supporting them in Africa, but sidelining them in Ukraine. While the Wagner mutiny appeared gravely consequential, in reality it was merely a blip for Russia in its foreign policy. In the end, the real losers of this are not Wagner nor Russia, but the people of Africa, who will continue to be subjugated by Wagner forces as they wage Russia’s other wars.